Please explain the analytical framework for assessing vertical restrictions on cartels and abuse of dominance. While the agreement in question may be subject to another EU group exemption, the category exemption does not apply to vertical agreements. Other common class exemptions include category exemption for motor vehicles, category exemption for technology transfer, category exemption for research and development, and category exemption for specialization agreements. Any horizontal or green green agreement, for which no class exemption is granted, must be reviewed by the parties themselves to determine whether the agreement is anti-competitive. To support this approach, the European Commission has published guidelines (see guidelines on vertical restrictions) on the main factors to be considered. Regulation (EC) No. 330/2010  exempts vertical agreements from the prohibition in Article 101, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which meet the requirements for the exemption and do not contain so-called “strict” restrictions on competition. The main exception concerns vehicle distribution agreements which, until 31 May 2013, are subject to a three-year extension of the Council`s Regulation (EC) (EC) No. 461/2010 (Regulation (EC) No. 1400/2002 .
 Although the latter regulation applies Regulation (EC) No. 330/2010 to motor vehicle repair and spare parts distribution agreements as of June 1, 2013, it also complements Regulation 330 with three additional “hardcore” clauses. Among the measures that could fall under these prohibitions with regard to vertical agreements are: which authority is responsible for enforcing anti-competitive vertical restrictions? Where are there several competent authorities, how are cases attributed? Do governments or ministers have a role to play? If the agreement contains one of the following characterized restrictions, the benefit of the category exemption for vertical agreements is lost for the entire agreement: the ICC may prohibit a minimum requirement for aspiration as a vertical restriction if it is originally or is likely to cause AAEC in India. To our knowledge, the ICC does not yet appear to have addressed the minimum barrier requirements as a vertical restriction. However, these obligations were considered in the context of the abuse of dominance provisions. For example, in the in Re Faridabad Industries Association and in the Adani Gas Limited (Case 71 of 2012), the ICC assessed whether a minimum duty of control constituted an abusive clause for the purchaser. While the ICC appreciated various commercial justifications for such contractual clauses, it found that the requirement on the purchaser to meet these minimum obligations, even in the event of an emergency termination, rendered the term “unfair” and therefore abusive. The ICC can evaluate any vertical agreement as long as it excludes competition in India. In addition to the above restrictions, the vertical limitation provisions in India also apply to anti-competitive binders and clusters. The anti-competitive commitment must meet the following conditions (Sonam Sharma/Apple Inc (Case 24 of 2011): there are cases in which certain types of agreements do not automatically fall within the scope of Article 101 of the TFUE, for example.
B: For the category exemption to be applicable to vertical agreements, each party`s market share must be less than 30% in the market or markets in question covered by the agreement.